Power and Progress

Power and Progress

Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson

In the Prologue, Acemoglu and Johnson (Nobel Prize of Economics awarded in 2024) challenge the reader to rethink what “progress” really means. They highlight that while technological improvements from the Middle Ages and the early modern period (like the heavy plow or three-field rotation) boosted agricultural output, they often failed to translate into genuine progress for the peasants who toiled under harsh conditions. This tension between technological advancement and the lived experience of ordinary people recurs throughout history. The authors argue that, despite living standards being undeniably higher today than in the past, progress is neither natural nor automatic. Instead, it emerges from a constant struggle between elites (investors, entrepreneurs, and powerful decision-makers) and the broader population, who are too often disempowered and excluded from the benefits of innovation.

A key theme of the book is the question of who controls technology and how it is applied. Automation, for instance, does not always mean gains in workers’ marginal productivity. In some cases, it raises average productivity but reduces the specific contribution of individual workers, leaving them more vulnerable to replacement. The authors describe the “productivity bandwagon” as a phenomenon in which technology can be deployed to empower workers and distribute gains more widely, or instead to displace workers, heighten surveillance, and concentrate power. This choice is shaped by the vision of those who guide technological change, and by the balance of power between workers and elites.

One of the most urgent contemporary challenges is the risk that AI could disempower workers and undo decades of economic gains made by the working class. This is not an inevitable outcome but a choice that reflects a persistent “capital utopia” mindset: the assumption that technology will always benefit society and that visionary leaders are inherently correct. History, however, shows that even visionary leaders can be both right and wrong. Ferdinand de Lesseps, for example, was celebrated for his success in overseeing the construction of the Suez Canal, which transformed global trade and connected East and West. Yet his subsequent attempt to replicate that success with the Panama Canal ended in spectacular failure, marred by corruption, disease, and financial ruin. The project had to be rescued and completed decades later by the Americans.

The same caution applies to AI: its trajectory depends on who shapes it and whose interests it serves.

Acemoglu and Johnson also emphasize how the greed of the wealthy and powerful shapes our current vision of technological progress. Without countervailing social power, we risk falling into a “vision trap” where technology is steered to serve the few. History demonstrates that whenever technological power became concentrated, whether in the hands of feudal lords in medieval Europe, plantation owners in the US, or communist party bosses in the Soviet Union, it was often wielded in the name of progress but left devastation in its path.

Considering the current geopolitical and economical scenario, my best quote for this book is:

"There are two things that are important in politics. The first is and I can't remember what the second one is".

We live in an era obsessed with technology and the utopian promises it brings: longer lifespans, material abundance, and even colonization of other planets. But technological advances frequently cater to the interests of the powerful, guided by their vision of progress. The authors illustrate this with historical examples: after the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and the French Revolution, Britain’s early industrialization initially destroyed jobs and livelihoods. It was only after the social rebalancing brought by a rising mercantile and industrial middle class, between 1870 and 1900, that wages improved, working conditions got better, and public health advanced. Conversely, technological expansion during 19th-century globalization often left poorer countries, like India and China, devastated by colonial trade practices, showing that technology’s benefits are not equally distributed.

AI epitomizes what they call the “mother of all inappropriate technologies.” Despite economic growth in some developing nations, more than three billion people still live on less than $6 a day. Rather than creating broad job opportunities, today’s AI trajectory is geared toward capital-intensive production, highly skilled workers, and elite service roles, far beyond the reach of most. This risks creating a two-tiered society reminiscent of the 18th-century Industrial Revolution, where the vast majority had little political or economic power and the initial phases of progress actually worsened living conditions for millions. Only when social power shifted did technological progress begin to align with broader welfare: transforming Britain’s hierarchical society in the second half of the 19th century.

Today, we risk repeating that pattern: a handful of top tycoons at the top, while regular people remain disempowered.